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Abstract: Safety-critical systems may contain a 
large number of functions having different 
security/safety levels and must ensure a continuous 
operational state. It is of prime importance to avoid 
errors propagation between system functions. One 
may identify two main solutions to tackle that 
problem. The first and classical solution relies on the 
federated architecture where different hardware 
nodes, each one executing one or several functions 
having the same security/safety level, are 
interconnected using communication channels. The 
second solution emerged recently and leaded to the 
definition of the integrated architecture where a 
same hardware node is able to execute several 
functions having different security/safety levels 
thanks to dedicated hardware (as Memory 
Management Unit) and software (as hypervisors). 
These two architectures have their own advantages 
and drawbacks in term of dependability, mass, 
processing power, consumption, integration and 
validation efforts, costs, etc. As a consequence, 
choosing the architecture is difficult and system 
engineers have to rigorously evaluate the 
deployment strategy.  
This paper presents an approach to 
automate the integration of an implementation on 
different architectures. As a result, it provides the 
ability to deploy the same code on several nodes 
(federated architecture) or on a partitioned system 
(integrated architecture). For that purpose, the 
TASTE tool-chain is extended to support the 
deployment on XtratuM, a hypervisor that is ported 
on space qualified processors. By using the new 
tool-chain, designers can automatically produce 
federated or partitioned systems and evaluate their 
efficiency in terms of resources consumption, 
performances as well as the impact in the 
development process. 
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1. Context & Background 
Avionics or aerospace systems are mission or life 
critical so that a failure may have catastrophic impact 
(premature end of mission, loss of life, etc.). As a 
result, these systems must be designed carefully in 
order to ensure a correct behaviour when they are 
operating. However, this has become extremely 
difficult due to the large number of requirements 
coming from different system domains (power, 
thermal, data handling, GNC, etc.) and have to be 
enforced in the implementation. As a consequence, 
the number of system functions increases 
significantly as well as interactions between these 
functions. It therefore becomes very complicated to 
evaluate the potential impact of modifications on the 
complete system. This problem becomes particularly 
difficult when a single system hosts functions with 
different levels of safety or security. 
To address these issues, two typical solutions are 
proposed; the federated versus the integrated 
deployments. 
1.1. Federated deployment 
The federated deployment consists in 
separating system functions on different hardware 
nodes, depending on their security or safety levels. 
Using this solution, one computer will host functions 
classified at high safety/security levels and another 
executes functions that are less critical. By enabling 
such a separation, functions are isolated one from 
another, which reduces the potential impact of a 
failure from one function to another classified at 
higher levels. 
 
Figure 1- Data acquisition/processing,  
functional view 
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Figure 1 illustrates a basic system with two 
functions: one that acquires data and another that 
processes them (e.g. this can be a basic system that 
acquires a sensor raw value and periodically stores 
the corresponding engineering value). Figure 2 
shows the deployment of these functions in a 
federated architecture: each function is deployed on 
a separated hardware node and the communication 
between them uses a physical network. 
 
 
Figure 2- Data acquisition/processing 
 federated deployment 
 
1.2 Integrated deployment 
The integrated deployment collocates all 
functions on the same computing node, no matter 
their safety/security level. However, each function is 
isolated from another using a dedicated separation 
layer. To avoid any potential error propagation of an 
error from one function to another, this separation 
layer provides the following features: 
1. Space isolation: each function is associated with 
a single memory segment to store its data/code 
and communication outside the memory 
allocation is explicitly declared and granted. 
2. Time isolation: each function has a unique time 
slice to execute its tasks. A function therefore 
cannot overrun its budget time so cannot impact 
another.  
As a consequence of the second deployment 
option, the function can be allocated to a partition, 
which is defined as a dedicated set of computing 
resources (memory, CPU time, IO) allocated to a 
specific function A separation kernel is responsible 
for enforcing the temporal and spatial isolation of the 
partitions. The approach is referred to as Time and 
Space Partitioning (TSP). 
The integrated deployment is illustrated in Figure 
3: each function is bounded to a partition and the 
communication uses the software bus provided by 
the separation kernel. 
1.3 Separation Kernels  
Several partitioning systems solutions are 
available for the design of embedded safety-critical 
systems either under commercial conditions (e.g. 
PikeOS [13] or VxWorks [14]) or open-source license 
(as POK [6]). While most of existing products comply 
to the Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) ARINC653 
[7] Application Programming (APEX) layer defined 
for the avionics domain, a recent ESA study [12] 
supported the port of the open source XtratuM 
hypervisor to space qualified processors. XtratuM 
can isolate several partition, each one executing one 
or several functions, either directly (bare code) or on 
top of a compatible operating system as RTEMS [9]. 
This approach is justified by the fact that RTEMS is a 
product supported by ESA [15]. 
 
Figure 3- Data acquisition/processing  
integrated deployment 
2. Problem 
When designing either an integrated or 
federated architecture it is the responsibility of the 
system architect/integrator to assess the impact of 
the deployment strategy on the overall project. There 
can be clear benefits in terms of mass, power and 
volume for reducing the number of on-board 
computing nodes. This benefit must be traded-off 
against the increased complexity due to the 
integrated functions.  
This trade-off must be performed early in the 
system lifecycle in order to initiate the subsystem 
and equipment procurement. As a consequence the 
system design is immature and shall need multiple 
interactions before a coherent concept can be 
agreed. The trade-off must include the following 
properties: 
• Independency of functional chains: can 
functional chains be identified that are 
independent or can be isolated such that they 
can be partitioned. If there are too many 
dependencies between functions, moving them 
to a partitioned infrastructure shall introduce 
delays caused by the inter-partition 
communication. In addition, failure propagation 
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can be an issue for functionally dependent 
application. How does a function react if a 
function it is dependent on has failed? In a true 
IMA system, functions must be independent of 
each other. This must be accounted for in the 
deployment strategy 
• IO latency: in order to reduce the complexity of 
the partition operating system the IO drivers are 
usually implemented in a dedicated IO partition, 
such that each IO device is ‘owned’ by a 
partition. This means that a function cannot 
directly access the IO and must communicate 
via the intermediary IO partition. This will 
introduce latency to the IO traffic not 
experienced in a federated architecture. 
• SW reuse: software originally intended for a 
federated architecture must be adapted to such 
an extent that the usefulness of reusing the 
software must be questioned. 
• Verification: each computing node, embedded 
software, and the communication network 
between the nodes must be individual verified 
and validated. This can lead to an extensive test 
campaign with schedule implications if changes 
have to be introduced late in the lifecycle. 
It is therefore essential that the system architect, 
or the system integrator, is able to follow an 
adequate process fully supported by tools in order to 
identify which deployment strategy is preferable. 
3. Approach 
The proposed approach is model centric. It 
relies in the description of the architecture of the 
system using a unique modelling language. 
However, a clear separation is maintained between 
the application and the architectures of both IMA and 
federated systems. This shall make possible to 
easily adapt the application to any of the two 
architectures. 
In addition, non-functional requirements are 
attached to the application. This includes the 
dynamic characteristics (e.g. Worst Case Execution 
Time) and expected behaviour (e.g. activation 
frequency). These requirements are used to 
automatically check the scheduling aspects at model 
level on the two architectures using specialized 
tools. This already makes possible first iterations 
and refinements on the scheduling requirements and 
eventually select one the two architectures very 
early in the process. 
Once the scheduling has been checked on 
the two architectures, the configuration and 
deployment code of the application on the two 
architectures is automatically generated for a 
dedicated target (e.g. PC/Linux workstation or 
LEON/RTEMS board). The application can then be 
executed on the target in order to validate the 
scheduling in a representative environment.  
 
 
Figure 4- Process architecture 
 
4. Process definition & implementation 
 The overall architecture of the proposed 
process is illustrated in figure 4. It relies on the 
Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) 
[2] to specify system architecture with its execution 
constraints. Then, models are processed by 
appropriate tools to validate system requirements 
(such as schedulability) or produce system 
implementation. By using the same specifications 
during system development phases and relying on 
automatic tools, we improve the development 
process consistency and avoid traditional errors or 
pitfalls (misuse of tools, manual error coding, etc.). 
 
 We tailor this generic process for exploring 
different architecture patterns, as illustrated in 5. We 
separate specifications in two layers: one generic 
that represents software aspects (tasks, 
subprograms, data types, etc.) and another with 
architecture-specific aspects. By doing so, we keep 
the common part (the application) in models and 
reuse it with platform-specific components. As 
illustrated in 5, we tailor this process to study 
federated and IMA architectures and investigate the 
impact of selected architecture on software aspects. 
 Next sections introduce the modelling 
language (AADL) and then, explain its supports for 
validating system requirements or generating the 
implementation on different architectures. 
AADL models 
System 
Analysis 
Automatic 
Implementation 
Validation 
report 
Execution 
traces 
Compliance ? 
 
 Page 4/9 
 
 
Figure 5 - Tailoring the process  
for architecture exploration 
 
 
 
4.1. Overview of AADL 
 The Architecture and Analysis Design 
Language [2] (AADL) has been designed by the SAE 
(Society of Automotive Engineers) and aims at 
modelling systems architecture. It allows the 
description of both software and hardware concerns 
and focuses on the definition of clear block 
interfaces. Models are expressed using a graphical 
or textual interface.  
 The AADL language [2] defines several 
components categories: hardware, software and 
hybrids. Hardware components are: 
1. Processor: model the physical processor (e.g.: 
x86 or LEON) and its associated operating 
system (e.g. Linux or RTEMS[15]). 
2. Virtual processor: separate the processor 
into several parts, either for the hardware 
(modelling several cores) or software (modelling 
partitions) aspects. 
3. Memory: model any memory in the system, from 
RAM to ROM, or hard drives.  
4. Bus: model a regular bus such as Ethernet. 
5. Virtual bus: represent either part of a bus 
(for example, modelling QoS aspects of a bus) 
or software concerns (protocols, etc.). 
6. Device: model any other device in the system 
(sensor, actuator, etc...). 
 
Software components are :  
1. Process: as a UNIX process, represents an 
address space where threads are executed. 
2. Thread: as POSIX threads, supports 
subprogram execution.  
3. Subprogram: models instructions flow. It 
represents a function or a procedure in a 
language (e.g. C/Ada) executed by a thread. 
4. Data: models either a data type (e.g. integer, 
float, etc.) or a data value (shared variable, etc.).  
 A special hybrid component (system) 
aggregates all system components altogether and 
so, makes the whole model.  
 A component can contain other components, 
in order to describe the hierarchy of the system. For 
example, a process component may contain 
several thread components.  
 AADL artefacts are associated with properties 
to represent specific aspects, such as timing 
requirements (period/deadline of a task) or 
constraints (size of a partition). The built-in standard 
property sets address most system properties while 
users can also add their own. AADL contains a set 
of properties, which can be extended by the user.  
 AADL components may use features, to 
model communication interfaces with other 
components. (For example, the arguments of a 
function can be considered as features for an AADL 
subprogram). Then, the connections section of 
a component connects these features, describing 
the data flow within the system architecture (For 
example, connecting thread features to 
subprogram features means that the data of the 
thread are used as arguments in a function-call). 
 
 
4.2. IMA and federated architectures modelling 
 As AADL supports the modelling of both 
software and hardware concerns and provides 
extensions mechanisms, we can tailor it to capture 
different architecture patterns. In that context, we 
use or adapt it to represent IMA or federated 
architectures. 
 
 Modelling federated architectures does not 
require specific pattern or properties and the built-in 
AADL constructs provides everything that is 
required: 
1. Application concerns are represented using 
several processes connected by buses. 
2. Each process (application) is bound to a 
processor (execution support) and a memory 
(for storing code and data). 
 
 On the other hand, describing IMA 
architecture requires using specific modelling 
patterns and properties to capture the 
partitioning/isolation policy. For that purpose, we 
tailor the language as follow: 
1. AADL processor components are decomposed 
into virtual processor. Processors represent 
the isolation layer (separation kernel) with its time 
isolation policy while virtual processors model 
partitions environment. Application processes are 
AADL model for software concerns 
System Analysis & Implementation 
Federated 
system 
IMA system 
System behaviour differences 
 
AADL model of 
federated arch. 
AADL model of 
IMA arch. 
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no longer associated to a processor (a regular 
OS) but to a virtual processor (a partition 
execution environment) to describe allocation of 
application over partitions. 
2. AADL memory components are divided with 
memory sub-components to model segments and 
the space isolation policy. Processes (application) 
are bound to these memory sub-components to 
represent segment allocation within the partitioned 
architecture and partitions isolation. 
 
 
4.3. Validating scheduling from models 
 As IMA architectures separate partitions with 
timing isolation, analyzing their execution would 
show its impact on application behaviour before 
implementing the system. To do so, we rely on tools 
that process AADL models and analyze system 
properties related to timing requirements. They 
provide the ability to validate scheduling concerns 
using specific heuristic computations or just 
simulation. 
 In our process, this analysis effort is carried by 
Cheddar [6], a scheduling validation tool. It already 
supports several analysis techniques for federated 
architecture and provides necessary features to 
describe specific scheduling requirements using a 
dedicated language. Thus, we can tailor Cheddar to 
specify IMA timing requirements so that designers 
can analyze the impact of the execution platform 
(IMA or federated) on the application behaviour. 
 
4.4. Code Generation 
 Once system requirements (such as 
scheduling) are validated at specification-level using 
appropriate tools, implementation needs to be 
created. Since producing the system by hand is 
error-prone and could make the implementation 
inconsistent with validated requirements, code is 
produced from specifications with appropriate tools. 
 For that purpose, our process relies on 
Ocarina [8], an AADL toolsuite with code generation 
functions that produces C or Ada code from models. 
It already supports federated architectures by 
generating POSIX-compliant code. On the other 
hand, it needs to be tailored to support IMA specific 
configuration directives and multi-layered 
architectures (time/space isolation, inter/intra-
partition communications, etc.). 
 For that reason, we modify Ocarina and add 
IMA support for Xtratum [3] so that it can generate 
implementation that targets both federated and IMA 
systems with respect to their specific requirements. 
 
4.5. Run-Time Support   
 Generated code is then linked with a run-time 
that supports application execution. System 
developers choose an appropriate run-time platform 
according to the expected architecture pattern. 
Federated architecture are deployed on top of well-
known operating systems such as RTEMS [9] or RT-
Linux while IMA systems uses specific projects such 
as XTratuM [3] or POK [5]. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 As our study aims at studying the differences  
of the integration of the same software architecture 
on different architectures, we use two 
representatives run-times. The federated 
architecture (figure 6) is built with two nodes 
executing RTEMS that communicate through a 
SpaceWire link. The IMA deployment (figure 7) is 
designed with two RTEMS instances on the same 
processor using XtratuM [3] which isolates each one 
in terms of time and space. 
 
5. Case-Study & Results 
 
5.1. Case-Study Specifications 
 Our case-study deploys a producer/consumer 
application on federated and IMA architectures. It 
consists of two tasks, which timing properties are 
reported in table 1:  
1. One cyclic that produces data periodically 
2. One sporadic triggered when receiving data 
 
 Task 1 Task 2 
Type Cyclic Sporadic 
Period 100ms 100ms 
Execution time 3ms 5ms 
Table 1 - Timing requirements of each task 
 
 Each task is bound to a separated process 
and the difference between federated and IMA 
deployment consists in few modelling variations: 
1. Federated architecture associates each 
process to a separate processor 
connected through a SpaceWire bus to 
transfer data, as depicted in figure 6. 
2. IMA architecture collocates the two 
processes on the same processor and 
communication is performed using inter-
partition communication, as shown in figure 7. 
Each partition has a fixed time slice of 200ms 
to execute its associated application. 
 
 This example clearly shows the difference 
between these architectures patterns: the federated 
uses a hardware-based isolation model (by using 
Figure 6 - Federated deployment 
Producer 
RTEMS 
Consumer 
RTEMS 
SpaceWire 
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different processors and hardware bus) while the 
IMA relies on a software-based isolation mechanism 
(the XtratuM [3] isolation layer).  
 
 
Figure 7 - IMA deployment 
 
5.2. AADL modelling 
AADL models are separated in two parts: 
1. Software concerns (deployment-agnostic) 
describe application aspects: data types to be 
used, tasks and processes. This is reused by all 
architectures. 
2. Deployment aspects describe the underlying 
architecture that supports application execution. 
One model is designed for each studied 
architecture pattern. 
 
 The software aspects are defined with two 
AADL process components: one for the producer 
and another for the consumer, each one containing 
a thread component to execute the application 
(subprograms). These two processes exchange data 
using AADL ports connection. Figure 8 depicts 
these aspects using the AADL graphical notation. 
 
 
Figure 8 - AADL model of software aspects 
 
 Then, the federated architecture is described 
by adding two nodes connected through a bus. Each 
node contains a processor component (hardware 
processor and the execution runtime), a memory (to 
store application code and data) and a device 
(communication through the bus). Then, we 
associate software concerns (processes and 
connections) to the hardware architecture. This is 
illustrated in Figure 9 that depicts the association 
between the generic software components and 
hardware components of the architecture. 
 
 Deployment of the software architecture in an 
IMA platform with AADL is illustrated in Figure 10. 
Each hardware component is decomposed into sub-
components to represent the separation: the main 
memory component is divided in two memory 
segments, each one allocated to a separate partition 
(process component). Similarly, the processor 
component is divided into two virtual 
processor components, each one representing a 
partition runtime that supports application execution. 
Finally, as we don’t use any bus, this hardware 
architecture does not contain any device or bus: the 
application connection is handled using the inter-
partitions communication layer provided by the 
isolation kernel layer. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 - Federated architecture model  
with integration of software aspects 
 
 
 Specific timing requirements are specified by 
associating specific properties on the textual 
notation of AADL components. Unfortunately, due to 
a lack of place, it cannot be included in this article 
but can be found on our main project website [1]. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 - IMA architecture model  
with integration of software aspects 
 
sender 
task 
receiver 
task 
Producer 
RTEMS 
Consumer 
RTEMS 
XTratum isolation layer 
sender 
process 
receiver 
process 
receiver 
runtime 
receiver 
segment 
sender 
device 
Main memory Isolation kernel 
sender 
process 
receiver 
process 
sender 
device 
receiver 
device 
receiver 
runtime 
SpaceWire bus 
sender process receiver process 
Software 
aspects 
Hardware 
aspects 
sender 
segment 
Software 
aspects 
Hardware 
aspects 
sender 
device 
sender 
memory 
receiver 
memory 
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5.3. Scheduling validation 
 Before implementing architectures, one 
interest consists in validating some characteristics. 
This provides the ability to check for potential error 
early and avoid any re-engineering efforts due to late 
design errors detection. Due to the specific 
scheduling policies of studied architectures, one 
concern is to validate timing requirements using 
system specifications. For that purpose, the 
proposed process simulates the architecture and 
ensures timing constraints enforcements. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Scheduling validation 
of the federated architecture 
 
 To do so, we rely on the Cheddar [6] 
scheduling analysis tool. It processes system 
specification and validate timing requirements either 
by using feasibility tests (such as Rate Monotonic 
Analysis) or simulating its execution according to 
tasks specification (period, deadline, execution time) 
and deployment constraints (scheduling algorithm, 
processor, etc.). 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - Scheduling validation  
of the IMA architecture 
 
 Scheduling diagrams produced by Cheddar 
are shown on figure 11 (federated architecture) and 
figure 12 (IMA architecture) and depict tasks 
activation time. While tasks of the federated 
architecture enforce their deadline as expected, the 
one from the IMA architecture is delayed due to 
partition timeslot. In fact, as partitions timeslots are 
longer than tasks period, partitions switch avoid 
tasks to be dispatched on time. In our case-study, 
the sender task cannot send new data instance on 
time because the second partition still own the 
processing resource when it is supposed to be 
activated.  
 
 
 
5.4. Implementation Generation & Execution 
 Once system specifications are analyzed, it is 
of particular interest to compare them with the run-
time behaviour. For that purpose, we implement the 
system using of automatic code generator, Ocarina 
[7, 8], which is able to integrate the same application 
code on different architecture. 
 While Ocarina already supports federated 
architectures since several years, its compliance 
with IMA architecture was limited to POK [5], an 
ARINC653-compliant run-time oriented for the 
avionics domain. So, we tailor the Ocarina code 
generation tools to support XtratuM [3], a hypervisor 
that is able to execute and isolate several RTEMS 
instance on the same processor. This deployment is 
more representative of space-related applications. 
 The implementation of the federated 
architecture relies on RTEMS 4.8 for LEON2 
processors. We also use a dedicated version that 
supports the RASTA board and their associated 
SpaceWire interfaces. On the other hand, the IMA 
architecture uses the XtratuM 3.1 hypervisor with 
RTEMS 4.8 as partition run-time (tailored to be 
executed on top of XtratuM). 
 Finally, to avoid timing issues due to the 
instrumentation code, metrics are sent after system 
execution. This is particularly important for the 
federated architecture, where the standard output 
uses the serial line and potentially consumes 
significant processing resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 - Tasks activation time during system 
execution (federated deployment) 
 
 
 
 
Sender 7980 8080 8180 8280 8380 
Receiver 10810 10910 11010 11110 11210 
Table 2 - Activation time of tasks  
on federated deployment (in ms) 
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5.5. Tasks activation validation at execution 
 Tasks activation times are reported in table 2 
(Federated architecture) and table 3 (IMA 
deployment). We also report them in figure 13 and 
figure 14 in order to have a graphical overview of 
timing differences between these two architectures. 
 In the federated architecture (table 2 and 
figure 13), there is a huge time delay between 
activation of the producer and receiving by the 
consumer. This time difference is due to the network 
latency: the sender node must invoke additional 
code to send the data through the SpaceWire 
interface and the receiver must also invoke 
networking driver code to retrieve fresh data 
instance. While this introduces latency between data 
production and consumption, each task enforces its 
deadline. 
 
 
Figure 14 - Tasks activation time during  
system execution (IMA deployment) 
 
Sender 1330 1430 1630 1630 1730 
Receiver 1440 1840 2240 2640 3040 
Table 3 - Activation time of tasks  
on IMA deployment (in ms) 
The IMA architecture (Table 3 and figure 14) 
does not have this latency issue because tasks 
communication is performed locally, using the 
hypervisor. However, the partitioning policy has an 
impact on tasks activation and may delay data 
processing. In the current example, as each partition 
is executed during 200ms, and thus, tasks execution 
from idle partitions is delayed. Moreover, as the 
partitions exchanged only one data, the receiving 
partition receives one data instance (the fresher one) 
when activated so that some data are lost. This 
would be solved by using queuing ports. 
 These preliminary results demonstrate that a 
deployment strategy would have an impact over 
application concerns and there is no ideal solution 
that may solve every potential issue: if deadlines are 
correctly enforced in the federated architecture, 
network latency could be a problem when data must 
be processed quickly. On the other hand, partitioned 
architectures avoid network latency concerns but 
may delay tasks activation, depending on the 
partitioning policy.  
Finally, it is also interesting to notice that 
results obtained during execution are different from 
the simulation. In consequence, if preliminary 
validation is an important matter when designing 
safety-critical architecture, inspecting the 
implementation would still be mandatory. 
 
5.5. Memory footprint analysis 
Automatic implementation generation 
provides the ability to retrieve metrics and evaluate 
advantages and drawbacks of each deployment 
strategy. In our case, we evaluate the memory 
footprint and compare the cost of the implementation 
on selected architectures. 
 
 Size 
Sender node 235124 bytes 
Receiver node 234 916 bytes 
Total 470 040 bytes 
Table 4 - Memory footprint of binaries 
 for the federated deployment 
Table 4 and table 5 report the memory 
footprints of our example on both federated and IMA 
architectures. Binaries were compiled with the 
RTEMS tool-chain (with GCC and its associated 
tools) and stripped to remove useless symbols. 
The results show that the lowest memory 
footprint is obtained with the IMA architecture. 
Indeed, each partition has an approximate size of 
150 Kbytes while applications that target a federated 
architecture as big as 230 Kbytes. This difference 
comes from the run-time costs: binaries for federated 
architectures have to embed device drivers code 
and other layer that are either useless in the IMA 
deployment (no required driver or function provided 
by the isolation layer). 
 
 Size 
Sender partition 154308 bytes 
Receiver partition 154756 bytes 
Isolation kernel 85 268 bytes 
Total 394 332 bytes 
Table 5- Memory footprint of binaries 
for the IMA deployment 
This shows that IMA architectures present 
great benefits compared to traditional run-time. A 
lightweight memory footprint implies that produced 
application will have less code to be reviewed and 
so, it would reduce validation activities, reducing the 
development effort and its associated costs.  
 
 Page 9/9 
 
6. Conclusions & Perspectives 
 
A seamless process aiming at facilitating the 
System architecture exploration has been defined. 
The tools supporting that process have been 
integrated and their use has been fully automated. 
The approach has been validated through its 
execution on a very simple application. As a result, 
the analysis of different architectures for the 
execution of an application is straightforward. The 
proposed approach allows the identification of the 
main drivers of the future implementations at an 
early stage. This analysis can be moved forwards up 
to the generation of code and its execution on a 
representative platform. This execution is the 
ultimate proof of the respect the timing requirements 
and the only able to provide valid budget reports. 
Thanks to the automation of verification and 
generation tasks, the proposed process is 
particularly adapted to the development of complex 
systems using an incremental approach. After first 
verifications and selections at model level, additional 
verifications and adaptations can be easily 
performed on a representative environment. 
Further steps are still needed to completely 
validate the approach. The process has been 
developed and validated on an extremely simple 
application having a limited number of requirements. 
In a next step, we intend to apply the same process 
to a Use Case more representative of complex 
space applications that include safety or security 
requirements. This will require the refinement of the 
architectures of both IMA and federated systems.  
The study case has selected XtratuM to 
support the partitioning but other IMA solutions for 
space applications exist or are currently developed 
as VxWorks653 and PikeOS. These two products 
could be supported in the future in order to enlarge 
the exploration area. 
ESA has initiated several studies (as 
COrDeT [16]) and supports a PhD project (Definition, 
realization and evaluation of a software reference 
architecture for use in space applications [17]) via 
the Networking/Partnering Initiative. These activities 
are dealing with component models where the 
modelling activities are focused on the functional 
parts of the applications. The integration of these 
models, describing the application software, with the 
models describing the architecture of the execution 
platform clearly appears of prime interest. This 
should make possible to automatically generate 
deployment solutions from the high-level definition of 
the functions of the system. To this end, the 
proposed process shall be extended to integrate 
new models or tools able to transform the models 
into AADL. Of course, the new process shall be able 
to manage the complete set of requirements in order 
to support their verification and ensure their 
traceability.  
Glossary 
AADL  Architecture Analysis & Design Language 
IMA  Integrated Modular Avionics 
QoS  Quality of Service 
TASTE The Assert Set of Tools for Engineering 
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